have some effect toward this end. The solution which he has chosen, i.e., constitutional amendment, is perhaps a solution, but not one which can be achieved in time to care for the important problems which we must soon be prepared to handle—though against this statement of the reviewer must be set the recent *Fortune* poll. It is not the constitutional provision which is at fault so much as the abuse of that power by Senators whom the people permit, and even encourage, to abuse it. Responsibility for the Senate rests with the people, and Professor Colegrove does well to address himself to them.

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Gauging Public Opinion. By HADLEY CANTRIL AND RESEARCH ASSOCIATES. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1944. Pp. vii, 318. $3.75.)

Implicitly rejecting Hegel's maxim that independence from public opinion "is the first formal condition of anything great and reasonable," the authors essay the first systematic survey of the methodology of public opinion research. While the book is unevenly written and, at times, too heavily technical for the non-specialist, it is, on the whole, amply rewarding.

It is a sign of vigor and a developing scientific attitude that nearly every criticism hitherto levelled against the inadequacy of public opinion polls to measure what they seek to measure is fairly dealt with, and in a spirit not wholly free from self-criticism and a recognition of limitations. The authors concede, for example, that many of the questions used by polling agencies, including some of their own, have been obscure in meaning or elicited only surface rationalizations or stereotyped answers.

Among the more difficult problems of polling agencies is the suitable framing of questions. The conclusions which emerge from careful investigation are that the multiple-choice type is often superior to the dichotomous type, which may misrepresent opinion by forcing adherence to sharp alternatives; the order in which alternatives are presented may be important when the issue is complicated, since there is a natural tendency to select the last, most easily remembered, alternative; questions inviting free answers, while difficult to score, may be increasingly useful; symbols of prestige in questions may affect the result; the suggestion that a law must be changed to lead to a desired result creates a certain amount of opposition on the part of people who would otherwise favor the result; and some people are less resistant to a policy if the question is worded to suggest that they will have a direct part in determining the policy.

A series of experiments and acute analyses have established, too, that intensity of reaction can now generally be measured with satisfactory results; that the secret ballot is to be preferred when testing opinion which may be socially disapproved; that when deep emotional loyalties are

involved, the bias of the interviewer may distort the result and, similarly, that distortion may come from a lack of *rapport* between the interviewer and the respondent; that refusals to answer questions are most frequent among the poor, women, and inhabitants of large cities, but, by and large, do not affect the extent to which the sample is representative; that the most practical method of sample selection is of the stratified random kind based on geographical and rural-urban distribution, color, economic status, age, and sex; that small, well-chosen samples are surprisingly reliable, yet must be used with caution; that some insight into causation can be obtained by skillful breakdown of results; that economic status determines opinion more than education where financial benefits, direct or indirect, may be involved, but that education is more important when allegiance to certain general social stereotypes is involved; that the tendency to pick scapegoats is especially characteristic of well-educated, upper-income groups; and that opinion is highly sensitive to important events, but does not, by and large, anticipate emergencies but only reacts to them.

The authors demonstrate how interviewer bias and other distortions may largely be eliminated or neutralized. They do not, of course, indicate how the bias of subscribers in using the material can be similarly eliminated or neutralized.

In a sop to Demos, the authors conclude that "by and large, if people in a democracy are provided educational opportunities and ready access to information, public opinion reveals a hard-headed common sense." This a priori and unproved assertion leaves unresolved the fundamental conflict over the value of the public opinion poll, i.e., will it improve our democracy or will a "parliamentary Aphrodite" rise "out of its foam"?

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TVA—Democracy on the March. BY DAVID E. LILIENTHAL. (New York: Harper and Brothers. 1944. Pp. xiv, 248. $2.50.)

This is a tract for the times, a ringing declaration of faith, a proclamation of high moral purpose. It is the answer to pessimistic prophecies of the managerial revolution or the wave of the future, theses with fascination for "the vain, the naïve, and the impatient." "*We have a choice,*" says the chairman of the TVA; and this hard-hitting, stirring book is the account of ten years in the lives of four and a half million people during which that choice has been exercised "not only *for* the people, but *by* the people." "Engineers can build us great dams, but only great people make a valley great. There is no technology of goodness. Men must make themselves spiritually free." This is the testament of a statesman of democracy; indeed, not the least of its interest is its aspect of an "Education of D. E. Lilienthal," from a brainy lawyer preoccupied with the power issue to a leader of the breadth of vision and historic time-sense here revealed.